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TRIAL OF TITLE TO REALTY IN A PERSONAL ACTION
An interesting application of an old common-law doctrine in a civil
law state is found in Ducros v. St. Bernard Cypress Co. (1918, La.)
82 So. 841.1 The plaintiff sued for the value of certain timber which
he alleged the defendant, in possession claiming title, had cut and
removed from his land.. The court held that the petition disclosed no
cause of action since the plaintiff was in effect suing for a disturbance
of possession, which he could not do where the defendant claimed title
to the realty, until the question of ownership had been settled.
Though the majority of the court relied upon a state statute protect-
ing the possession of even a wrongful possessor, the rule of the ancient
common law was similar in the favor which was shown to the person
who had acquired the seisin of land, even though he was not the owner
thereof. It was early settled by statute2 that there could be no dis-
'O'Neill and Provosty, JJ. dissenting.
25 Rich. IL 1381, ch. 7.
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turbance of one's possession of realty, even by the rightful owner, but
that the remedy was a trial of the title.3 So now generally the pos-
sessor has his remedy of an action of forcible entry and detainer
against even the rightful owner for any disturbance of his possession.4
This leads to the further general holding that nothing short of a direct
attack upon the title of the possessor will suffice, and that the title
cannot be indirectly attacked in some other form of action. Thus,
while a personal action such as trover will ordinarily lie for things
actually severed from the realty, yet it is almost universally held that
such action cannot be maintained when the defendant claims title to
the realty.' The courts usually content themselves by saying in justi-
fication of the rule that title to realty cannot be tried in a transitory
action,6 though the real reason would appear to be the historical one
above suggested, that the person in possession under claim of title was
to all intents and purposes the owner until the real owner proved his
superior title. It is, however, asserted that the rule is justified as
preventing the useless litigation that would result if a suit might be
brought for every blade of grass cut, instead of a single suit for eject-
'Coke, Littleton (igth ed. 1832) *257a, note i; Swift's Digest (Rev. ed. i862)
*5iO The rule of the civil law was similar in that it protected the possessor
against all except the person he had dispossessed, and against the latter after
one year. Dig. lib. 43, tit. 17; Savigny, Possession (6th ed. Perry, 1848) 313,
314; 2 Mackeldey's Roman Law (Transl. Dropsie, x883) pars. 24o, 259, 263.
This is in effect the provision of the Code of Practice, Art. 49, La. Rev. Civil
Code, Art. 3456, relied on by the court in the principal case.
"Fults v. Munro (igix) 2o2 N. Y. 34, 95 N. E. 23; see cases collected in ii
R. C. L. 1134ff.
'Anderson v. Halper (1864) 34 Ill. 436, 85 Am. Dec. 318 (replevin); Gunder-
son v. Holland (1911) 22 N. D. 258, 133 N. W. 546 (replevin); Hooker v.
Latham (1896) ix8 N. C. 179, 23 S. E. 1004 (replevin and trover); Pacific Live
Stock Co. v. Isaacs (I9O8) 52 Ore. 54, 96 Pac. 46o (trover) ; Ruggles v. Sand
(1879) 4o Mich. 559 (trespass); Robertson v. Rodes (1852, Ky.) 13 B. Mon.
325 (action on the case); Bigelow v. Jones (183o, Mass.) io Pick. 161 (indeb-
itatus assumpsit); Parks v. Morris, Layfield & Co. (i9o7) 63 W. Va. 51, 59
S. E. 753 (same); Downs v. Finnegan (1894) 58 Minn. 112, 59 N. W. 981
(same). Contra, Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Ross (1904) 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1251, 83
S. W. 635 (assumpsit). Though the point was not discussed the following
cases also seem contra: Single v. Schneider (1869) 24 Wis. 299 (replevin);
Railway v. Hutchins (1877) 32 Oh. St. 57I (trover); Wetherbee v. Green
(1871) 22 Mich. 311 (replevin). Curtis v. Deepwater R. R. (ig9I) 68 W. Va.
762, 70 S. E. 776 (assumpsit) is distinguishable since there the parties had made
an express contract for the sale of the timber. Cases are collected in 85 Am.
Dec. 321; 5 C. J. 1389; 34 Cyc. 1365, 1367; and 38 Cyc. 2o40. In Pennsylvania
the rule is changed by statute in case of replevin. National Transit Co. v.
Weston (1888) 121 Pa. 485, I5 Atl. 569. An extreme application of the rule is
found in Morgan v. Varick (1832, N. Y.) 8 Wend. 587, where the plaintiff,
having spent his -six years in getting his ejectment action tried, was finally
defeated in his trespass action because of the statute of limitations.
'Lehigh Zinc &" Iron Co. v. New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co. (3893, Ct. Err. &
App.) 55 N. J. L. 350, 26 Atl. 92o.
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ment in which mesne profits might also be recovered.7 It seems to be
a case where the old feudal rules of policy still persist and that, in
order to prevent an endless clamor, we, too, should treat that man as
owner who is in possession claiming to be owner, so long as no one
else has proven a superior claim to that position." The rule does not
apply in favor of a mere trespasser; there must be actual disseisin,
that is, a bona fide claim of title by a defendant who is in possession of
the realty.9 Nor does it apply to the decision of questions incidental
to the trial of title, where the issue is not directly that of title, as for
instance, where the question is whether or not the adverse possession
has terminated before bringing of suit.10 In the principal case the
plaintiff apparently was attempting to raise the issue of title," - and at
first blush it would appear that the court was holding him to a techni-
cality which would increase, rather than diminish, litigation. But the
rules of policy seem sufficiently strong, so that the decision declining
to consider the issue of title in this form of action is in reality more
than the application of a rule of procedure, and is entirely justified.
Even after the issue of title is determined it is not settled just how
far the owner can go in seeking redress, whether he is limited merely
to a recovery of the mesne-profits from the person who has been in
wrongful possession, together with incidental damage to the realty,
such recovery to be had in connection with the ejectment action, or
thereafter in a separate suit, or is to be then permitted to recover
things severed from the realty in specie or their value. The latter
remedy has been denied against a disseisor, and a fortiori against his
assignee, in the case of severed crops.1 2 It has even been denied in
the case of cut timber" and of severed fixtures.14  It seems, however,
to have been rather generally allowed in all cases except those of
severed crops, i. e., fructus industriales.15  As to unsevered crops,
there seems also to be no question; they go to the disseised owner no
'Powell v. Smith (1833, Pa.) 2 Watts, 126.
' For the analysis of the meaning of "ownership," see Cook, Hohfeld's Con-
tributions to the Science of Law (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 721, 729, 730.
Compare also the rule as to personalty that the possessor is considered as having
title as against all but the true owner, CommENT (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
91, 93.
'Davis v. Easley (851) 13 I11. 192.
Phelps v. Church etc. (19oo, C. C. A. 3d) 99 Fed. 683, 40 C. C. A. 72.
"See the dissenting opinion.
'Jenkins v. McCoy (1872) 50 Mo. 348; Johnston v. Fish (1895) 1O5 Calif.
42o, 38 Pac. 979; contra, Simpkins v. Rogers (1854) 15 Ill. 397; Thomas v.
Moody (1834) 11 Me. 139.
'Roberts Bros. v. Hurdle (1849) 32 N. C. 490.
"4 Powell v. Smith, supra.
"Page v. Fowler (187o) 39 Calif. 412; Stockwell v. Phelps (1866) 34 N. Y.
363; DeMott v. Hagerman (1828, N. Y.) 8 Cow. 22o.
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matter by whom planted.' 6 It is submitted that the distinction drawn
between fructus industriales when severed and other things, including
fructus naturales, severed from the realty, is proper. Crops are
largely the result of the care and labor put upon them and do not in
any serious measure injure the freehold. It is just, therefore, that the
owner should recover only the net gain." On the other hand, where
things are severed to the permanent injury or depreciation in value of
the freehold, there is no reason why ownership should be changed by
the disseisor's wrongful act, and they should be recoverable to the
same extent as any other objects of property. The principal case does
not make it clear whether or not the court follows this rule, though a
suggestion that it does may be found in the court's reference to a
possibility of suit by the plaintiff after the termination of the adverse
possession.
C. E. C.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The question of whether the doctrine of last clear chance is an
exception to the general rule of contributory negligence is again
raised by the recent case of Ellerinan Lines, Ltd. v. H. and G. Grayson,
Ltd. (1919, Ct. App.) 121 L. T. Rep. 5o8. In this case the defendants,
ship repairers, undertook to rivet cleats to the weather deck of the
plaintiff's steainer. The rivets were heated on the weather deck and
carried to an open hatch, through which they were lowered in a
bucket to the "'tween" deck, where they were driven into the weather
deck by a riveter. A cargo was being discharged from a hold below
the "'tween" decks, and the hatch of both the "'tween" and weather
decks being open, a cargo of highly inflammable jute was exposed
through the hatches to anything falling from the weather deck. A
boy in the employ of the defendants, carrying a red-hot rivet in a pair
of tongs to the bucket, slipped on the deck, and the.rivet fell through
both hatches into the lower deck and set the jute on fire. The case
was tried by the court without a jury. The court held that the
defendants were negligent in doing their work in the manner described
while the jute lay exposed, and (by two of the three judges) that, if
the shipowners were guilty of contributory negligence (as to which
the judges disagreed), then their negligence was not the proximate
cause of the damage and did not prevent a recovery.
Clearly the defendants were guilty of negligence. Was the plain-
tiff guilty of negligence? And if so, did such negligence contribute
to the injury, as an efficient cause between the parties, so as to bar a
recovery by the plaintiff? The evidence showed that the plaintiff
'McGinnis v. Fernandes (i8go) 135 IM. 69, 26 N. E. iog; Craig v. Watson
(1881) 68 Ga. 114; Freeman v. McLennan (i8i) 26 Kan. 151.
17Lindsay v. Winona, etc., Ry. (1882) 29 Minn. 411, 13 N. W. 191.
